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This note collects, classifies and evaluates common criticism against the deBroglie-Bohm theory, including Ock-
ham’s razor, asymmetry in the deBroglie-Bohm theory, the “surreal trajectory” problem, the underdetermination
of the deBroglie-Bohm theory and the question of relativistic and quantum field theoretical generalizations of the
deBroglie-Bohm theory. We argue that none of these objections provide a rigorous disproof, they rather highlight
that even in science theories can not solely be evaluated based on their empirical confirmation.
1. Introduction
In a previous article [74] we have argued that
the deBroglie-Bohm theory can play an impor-
tant role in teaching quantum mechanics since it
provides an alternative view-point and illustrates
the peculiar features of quantum phenomena. Of
course most adherents of the deBroglie-Bohm
theory would assign a more ambitious meaning
to the theory and do rather claim its superiority
to the ordinary formulation (or interpretation) of
quantum mechanics. In this note we will exam-
ine some common objections raised against the
deBroglie-Bohm theory.
In answering the question posed in the title
one should first remark that the ongoing de-
bate on the foundations of quantum mechanics
has produced a vast number of different schools
and interpretations. Presumably, the majority of
physicists has lost track of this complex debate
about the measurement problem, hidden vari-
ables, EPR, Bell etc. In a similar context this
was strikingly expressed by David Mermin:
Contemporary physicists come in two
varieties. Type 1 physicists are both-
ered by EPR and Bell’s Theorem.
Type 2 (the majority) are not, but
one has to distinguish two subvari-
eties. Type 2a physicists explain why
they are not bothered. Their expla-
nations tend either to miss the point
entirely (like Born’s to Einstein) or to
contain physical assertions that can
be shown to be false. Type 2b are not
bothered and refuse to explain why.
(quoted from [83])
Even if one takes this remark with a pinch of salt,
Mermin’s observation that many physicists do not
have a well founded standpoint in this affair seems
to be correct.
Another reason for being rather indifferent to
the deBroglie-Bohm theory is evidently the fol-
lowing. This theory can be viewed as a way to
solve the conceptual problems of quantum me-
chanics. Those who are satisfied with the answers
given by the standard interpretation (e.g. David
Mermin [71]) or who favor other non-standard in-
terpretations (like many-worlds, consistent histo-
ries, Floyd’s trajectory interpretation or the like)
are consequently not attracted by the deBroglie-
Bohm theory.
However, our concern is with criticism and
objections which are explicitly directed against
the deBroglie-Bohm theory. It is rather popular
among adherents of the deBroglie-Bohm theory
to blame mainly historical and sociological rea-
sons for the contempt of their theory [12,26,60].
We do not negate that these reasons may have
played some role, although such a claim is hard
to verify explicitly. In any case such a position
renders the criticism as completely irrational and
makes a sober discussion difficult. In fact there
has been response to e.g. Bohm’s paper from
1952. Wayne Myrvold, who has analyzed early
objections against the deBroglie-Bohm theory,
writes [73] :
Bohm’s theory did not meet with the
acceptance in the physics community
that Bohm had hoped for. It was not,
however, ignored; several prominent
physicists, among which were Ein-
stein, Pauli, and Heisenberg, wrote
articles expressing their reasons for
not accepting Bohm’s theory.
In what follows we will also explore these early
objections1.
1In fact, not all of the early reactions were hostile. For ex-
ample in 1953 Joseph Keller from the New York University
published a Physics Review paper in which he analyzed
2The objections against the deBroglie-Bohm
theory can roughly be divided into two classes2.
The first applies meta-theoretical considerations
i.e. invokes criteria like symmetry or simplicity
to discard the deBroglie-Bohm theory. Section 3
is devoted to these arguments. The other class
of criticism seeks for a more textual or theory-
immanent debate, like challenging the consistency
or the ability of the deBroglie-Bohm theory to be
generalized. This debate will be reviewed in Sec-
tion 4.
For completeness we will give a brief summary
of the deBroglie-Bohm theory in Sec. 2. A thor-
ough discussion of the deBroglie-Bohm theory
can be found e.g. in [14,23,26,60,75].
2. The deBroglie-Bohm theory
The deBroglie-Bohm theory describes a non-
relativisticN -particle system by its wavefunction,
ψ, and the position, Qi, of the corresponding
quantum objects (e.g. electrons, atoms or the
like). The wavefunction, which is derived from
the ordinary Schro¨dinger equation, guides the
particle motion via the so-called guidance equa-
tion:
dQi
dt
=
1
mi
∇iS(Q1, · · · , QN ) (1)
Here mi denotes the mass of particle i, ∇i is the
nabla operator applied to its coordinates and S
the phase of the wavefunction in the polar repre-
sentation ψ = Re
i
h¯
S .
Since the guidance condition 1 is a first-order
equation, one initial condition fixes the motion
uniquely. Given a ρ = |ψ|2 distribution as ini-
tial positions Equ. 1 will reproduce all predictions
of ordinary quantum mechanics in terms of posi-
tion distributions. Since all measurements can
be expressed in terms of position (e.g. pointer
positions) this amounts to full accordance with
all predictions of ordinary quantum mechanics.
Thereby the deBroglie-Bohm theory assigns a
distinguished role to position and does not in-
dependently assign possessed-values to other ob-
servables. This ensures that the Kochen-Specker
“no-go” theorem does not apply to the deBroglie-
Bohm theory. What might be regarded as the
values of quantum observables like spin, momen-
tum or the like get established only in the context
of a corresponding measurement-like experiment.
From the viewpoint of the deBroglie-Bohm the-
ory this “contextuality” amounts essentially to
the role of probability in Bohm’s interpretation [64]. He
qualified Bohm’s work as an “interesting interpretation”
of quantum mechanics.
2These classes are not completely disjoint and serve also
the purpose to structure the presentation.
the observation, that the outcome of an exper-
iment depends on the way it is performed.
As mentioned above the deBroglie-Bohm the-
ory reproduces all predictions of ordinary quan-
tum theory provided that the initial positions
of particles described by the wavefunction ψ are
|ψ|2 distributed. The motivation of this so-
called quantum equilibrium hypothesis has been
explored for example in [36,89]. Most impor-
tant, the quantum mechanical continuity equa-
tion (Equ. 2) ensures that this condition is con-
sistent i.e. any system will stay |ψ|2 distributed
if the quantum equilibrium hypothesis holds ini-
tially.
∂|ψ|2
∂t
+∇
(
|ψ|2 ·
∇S
m
)
= 0. (2)
It follows that in a universe being in quantum
equilibrium it is not possible to control the initial
positions beyond the |ψ|2 distribution. Hence the
deBroglie-Bohm theory does not allow for an ex-
perimental violation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle [89]. While ordinary quantum mechan-
ics assumes that probability enters on a funda-
mental level, the deBroglie-Bohm theory is de-
terministic and probability enters only as an ex-
pression of ignorance. However, given the quan-
tum equilibrium hypothesis this ignorance holds
in principle. Thus the fundamental determinism
is turned into predictive indeterminism.
The important feature of Equ.1 is its non-
locality. The guidance equation links the motion
of every particle to the configuration of the whole
system, no matter how distant its different parts
are. Technically expressed this follows from the
fact, that the wavefunction ψ (hence its phase S)
at a given time is a function on the configuration
space IR3N . It is exactly this non-locality which
allows the deBroglie-Bohm theory to violate the
Bell inequalities [9] as demanded by experiment3.
However, this non-locality vanishes if the wave-
function factorizes in the contributions of the dif-
ferent particles.
The guidance condition 1 can be motivated in
different ways and its precise status gives rise to
different interpretations of the deBroglie-Bohm
theory. The starting point of Bohm’s original pre-
sentation of the theory4 in 1952 [18] was the de-
composition of the Schro¨dinger equation for the
3Note, that the two “no-go” theorems of Bell and Kochen-
Specker actually strengthen the position of the deBroglie-
Bohm theory. The first shows that “hidden variable”
theories have to be non-local in order to agree with the
predictions of quantum mechanics. The second rules out
that a mapping of all observables to possessed values can
be achieved. Hence, the corresponding properties of the
de Broglie-Bohm theory (namely the non-locality and con-
textuality) are no shortcomings but necessities.
4We refer to this theory as de Broglie-Bohm theory since
3wavefunction ψ = Re
i
h¯
S into a set of two equa-
tions for the real functions R and S. The resulting
equation for S has a structure similar to the clas-
sical Hamilton-Jacobi equation for the action S,
which implies p = ∇S. The only difference is the
appearance of an extra term which Bohm named
“quantum potential”:
Uquant = −
h¯2
2m
∇2R
R
(3)
Bohm (and later also e.g. Hiley [22] and Holland
[60]) regard the quantum potential as the key in-
gredient of the deBroglie-Bohm theory and derive
all its novelty from it. The guidance equation 1
is only viewed as a “special assumption” [20] or
a “consistent subsidiary condition” [19].
In contrast to this position another school of
the deBroglie-Bohm theory regards the guid-
ance condition as the fundamental equation and
avoids emphasizing the quantum potential. The
main proponents of this school are Du¨rr et al.
[14,29,36,38] who have named their version of
the deBroglie-Bohm theory “Bohmian mechan-
ics”. This view was anticipated by John Bell
in his work on the deBroglie-Bohm theory [11].
In fact the guidance equation can be motivated
without appeal to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
from symmetry arguments alone [36]. According
to this position the quantum potential deserves no
special attention and is rather viewed as an arte-
fact which enters the discussion when the classical
limit of the theory is treated.
One should not mistake this discussion as only
quibbling over a mathematical ambiguity in the
formulation of the theory. In fact these different
interpretations of Equ.1 are related to a substan-
tial difference of view on e.g. the role of “ob-
servables” other than position or the meaning of
the wavefunction. Our discussion of objections
against the deBroglie-Bohm theory is in part
complicated by this debate on the interpretation.
If some criticism applies more strongly or solely to
one specific interpretation of the deBroglie-Bohm
theory, it does not undermine the concept as a
whole. Likewise the different interpretations pro-
vide different replies to the objections. The differ-
ent interpretation of the deBroglie-Bohm theory
will be disentangled elsewhere [76].
Since the rest of our note will be concerned
with the objections against the deBroglie-Bohm
theory we should balance the discussion by some
brief remarks on its merits. The supporters of the
deBroglie-Bohm theory emphasize its “clear on-
tology” i.e. that the vague notion of “complemen-
tarity” and wave-particle duality becomes dis-
Louis de Broglie presented similar ideas already in 1927
[15]. David Bohm’s work in 1952 was done independently.
pensable. Within the deBroglie-Bohm theory one
can consistently entertain the notion of particle
trajectories. However, this should not be misun-
derstood as adherence to classical prejudices but
provides an elegant solution of the measurement
problem. The superposition of the wavefunction
at the end of a measurement causes no difficulty
since the actual position of the system corre-
sponds to the actual outcome. In addition the
deBroglie-Bohm theory provides means to deal
non-ambiguously with the question of tunneling
time or time-of-arrival [65–67]. Some authors also
suggest that the deBroglie-Bohm theory has con-
ceptual advantages over quantum mechanics in
connecting quantum mechanics to other theories
such as chaos theory and classical mechanics [28]
or when dealing with CP violation [63].
3. The meta-theoretical debate
Most authors accept that the deBroglie-Bohm
theory and ordinary non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics make identical predictions i.e. that no ex-
periment can decide which one to prefer5 . Even
Wolfgang Pauli admitted in a letter to Bohm from
December 1951:
I do not see any longer the possibil-
ity of any logical contradiction as long
as your results agree completely with
those of the usual wave mechanics and
as long as no means is given to mea-
sure the values of your hidden param-
eters (...). [78, letter 1313])
But this was only a minimal concession to
Bohm. In the absence of any new prediction
the deBroglie-Bohm theory was accused of being
not physics but “metaphysics” [77]. Heisenberg
questioned whether the deBroglie-Bohm theory
should be regarded as a new theory at all:
From the fundamentally positivistic
(it would perhaps be better to say
purely physical) standpoint, we are
thus concerned not with counter-
proposals to the Copenhagen inter-
pretation, but with its exact repeti-
tion in a different language. (quoted
after [73])
5In fact every now and then such an experiment is
proposed nevertheless. The attempts to construct cir-
cumstances in which the predictions of the deBroglie-
Bohm theory and quantum mechanics disagree are ac-
tually pointless since the deBroglie-Bohm theory repro-
duces all predictions of ordinary quantum mechanics by
definition. Above all, the Schro¨dinger-equation is part of
the deBroglie-Bohm theory and the individual trajectories
can not be controlled beyond the quantum equilibrium.
4The Heisenberg pupil von Weizsa¨cker reports on
a course in the winter term 1953/54 in which they
discussed also Bohm’s work [91]:
Unsere U¨berzeugung, daß alle diese
Versuche falsch seien, wurde durch
das Seminar besta¨rkt. Aber wir kon-
nten uns nicht verhehlen, dass der
tiefste Grund unserer U¨berzeugung
ein quasi a¨sthetischer war. Die
Quantentheorie u¨bertraf alle Konkur-
renten in der fu¨r eine “abgeschlossene
Theorie” kennzeichnenden einfachen
Scho¨nheit.6
However, the above quoted passages alone do
not constitute any reason to reject the deBroglie-
Bohm theory. In the absence of any “logical
contradiction” (Pauli) and while objecting to the
mere “repetition in a different language” (Heisen-
berg) one needs to specify why the ordinary quan-
tum theory actually “surpasses all competitors”
(v. Weizsa¨cker). Or to put it differently: addi-
tional criteria need to be formulated which help
to distinguish these theories.
In what follows we collect and evaluate a num-
ber of these additional criteria which have been
suggested by the above mentioned authors and
others to underpin their rejection. We classify
them as “meta-theoretical” since they are largely
based on requirements which are supposed to ap-
ply to physics theories in general.
3.1. Ockham’s razor
The obvious objection against the deBroglie-
Bohm theory is that it does not make any
new predictions while postulating the particle-
position as a new entity. If two theories are equiv-
alent the one should be preferred which needs
fewer premises. Likewise additional premises
which do not enrich the explanatory power should
be removed by invoking “Ockham’s razor”. Given
this widely accepted principle, it appears natural
by some to discard the deBroglie-Bohm theory
since the particle trajectories seem to be exactly
such an extra premise. However, this conclu-
sion can be challenged by the following consider-
ation: the deBroglie-Bohm theory supplements
ordinary quantum mechanics by an equation-
of-motion for the quantum-particles, but elim-
inates the postulates which are related to the
measurement process (not to mention how (un-
)compelling these postulates are). Furthermore
6This course strengthened our conviction that all this tri-
als were false. But we could not conceal to ourselves
that the deeper cause for this belief was quasi “aestheti-
cal”. Quantum mechanics surpassed all competitors by its
simple beauty which characterizes a “complete theory”.
(translation by the author)
the deBroglie-Bohm theory provides a completely
new interpretation of quantum phenomena in
which e.g. probability plays no fundamental role.
In other words: the descriptive content is identi-
cal but one can question whether these theories
are equivalent at all. Hence, it is questionable
whether the precondition for applying Ockham’s
razor is met.
3.2. Asymmetry in the deBroglie-Bohm
theory
Pauli and Heisenberg based their rejection of
the deBroglie-Bohm theory mainly on its asym-
metry with respect to position and momentum
[73]. In the absence of any new prediction they
did not accept this sacrifice.
The reply to this objection is twofold: (i) The
deBroglie-Bohm theory gives position a different
ontological status than all other “observables”
[29] in order to achieve a clear ontology and to
solve conceptual problems of the ordinary formu-
lation of quantum mechanics. After all symmetry
is no end in itself. (ii) Moreover, the Hamilto-
nian in orthodox quantum theory is not invariant
under general unitary transformations, though it
is under the usual space time symmetries. Thus
even there it is not the case that all observables
are on the same footing.
However, in reply to this criticism Hiley and
Brown [24,59] explore the possibility to formu-
late a Bohm-like theory in other than the position
representation. Bohm himself took this objection
very seriously and was lead to the following mod-
est claim:
Heisenberg shows that he perhaps did
not appreciate that the only purpose
of this phase of the work was to show
that an alternative to the Copenhagen
interpretation is at least logically pos-
sible. (D. Bohm, quoted from [73])
In fact the deBroglie-Bohm theory shows an-
other asymmetry, namely with respect to the
wavefunction. While the wavefunction acts on
the particle position, the particles do not react
on the ψ-field. It is determined independently by
the Schro¨dinger equation. It is true that this con-
stitutes a peculiar feature of the deBroglie-Bohm
theory. In reply to this objection Du¨rr et al. [38]
have suggested that the role of the wavefunction
within the deBroglie-Bohm theory should be re-
garded as analogous to the role of the Hamilto-
nian in classical mechanics. They state [38]:
We propose that the reason, on the
universal level, that there is no ac-
tion of configurations upon wavefunc-
tions, as there seems to be between
5all other elements of physical reality,
is that the wavefunction of the uni-
verse is not an element of physical re-
ality. We propose that the wave func-
tion belongs to an altogether different
category of existence than that of sub-
stantive physical entities, and that its
existence is nomological rather than
material. We propose, in other words,
that the wavefunction is a component
of physical law rather than of the re-
ality described by the law.
In [47] this idea is applied in the context of quan-
tum gravity.
3.3. Return to classical physics?
A rather unspecific but never the less common
objection against the deBroglie-Bohm theory is
its supposed return to classical notions. For ex-
ample Englert states in [43] about the purpose of
the deBroglie-Bohm theory and its trajectories:
Mit Berufung auf diese Bahnen
sind atomare Vorga¨nge dann de-
terministisch, und das erspart uns
die Trauerarbeit, die uns der Ver-
lust des deterministischen Newton-
MaxwellschenWeltbildes abverlangt.7
This claim of “backwardness” is in itself no strong
argument against the deBroglie-Bohm theory.
One needs to add (and explain) at least why this
“return” is supposed to be artificial or needless.
However, this argument remains weak, since the
deBroglie-Bohm theory possesses so many traits
which are common to quantum mechanics and
completely unclassical (e.g. wavefunction on the
configuration space, nonlocality etc.pp.) that it
does a disservice to anyone seeking for a “re-
turn to a Newton-Maxwell world view”. Agreed,
the features of determinism and ‘objectivity’8 are
‘classical’, but in this respect the deBroglie-Bohm
theory is as classical as the theory of relativity.
3.4. Departure from established principles
While Section 3.3 mentioned the objection
of “backwardness” the deBroglie-Bohm theory
meets also with the contrary criticism. Here the
bizarre features of the deBroglie-Bohm theory are
the subject of discomfort9.
According to the deBroglie-Bohm theory the
wavefunction produces an actual physical effect
7With appeal to these trajectories the atomic sequence of
events gets deterministic and the mourning-labor about
the loss of the Newton-Maxwell world view gets dispens-
able. (translation by the author)
8In the sense of ‘observer independence’
9Some of the objections which have been mentioned in
Sec. 3.2 do fit into this category as well.
on the particle motion. In this respect it may
be compared to other physical fields like electro-
magnetic or gravitational fields. This view was
for example held by Bell [11][p.128]. This intro-
duces peculiar notions into physics indeed. First
of all the quantum mechanical wavefunction is
defined on the configuration space of the sys-
tem. This is in sharp contrast to any other phys-
ical field. The non-locality is closely related to
this feature and will be the subject of Sec. 4.3.
As mentioned above (see Sec. 3.2) Du¨rr et al.
[38] have proposed that the role of the wavefunc-
tion within the deBroglie-Bohm theory should be
rather compared to the role of the Hamiltonian in
classical mechanics. The Hamiltonian is a func-
tion on the phase space, that is of greater dimen-
sion and even more abstract than configuration
space. Following this suggestion certainly weak-
ens this allegation. Interestingly, in this reading
of the deBroglie-Bohm theory the role of ψ is sim-
ilar to the widespread (“orthodox”) view of the
wavefunction as a computational tool.
Viewing the wavefunction as “nomological”
rather than “physical real” helps also to reply to
the objection that the deBroglie-Bohm theory in-
troduces myriads of “empty waves” into the pic-
ture of physical reality. These are the branches of
the wavefunction which do not contain the par-
ticle on its trajectory hence do not correspond
to the actual state of the system. Although one
can argue that due to decoherence effects these
empty branches do typically not affect the actual
system any more10, this feature remains unaes-
thetic. However, as mentioned above, viewing
the wavefunction as analog to the Hamiltonian
invalidates this allegation.
Finally, no matter whether based on a phys-
ical real or nomological wavefunction, does the
dynamics of the deBroglie-Bohm theory posses a
very unclassical trait. The effect on the particle
motion via the wavefunction is independent of its
amplitude. This can be seen for example when
the quantum-potential formulation is used. Since
ψ appears in the numerator and the denominator
of expression 3, ψ and c·ψ lead to the same effect.
Bohm and Hiley have therefore compared the ψ-
field to radio waves which guide an object like a
ship on automatic pilot. Here too, the effect of
the radio waves is independent of their intensity
and depends on their form [22] only. Bohm and
Hiley have coined the expression “active informa-
tion” for this sort of influence and suggest that
the quantum potential is a source of this kind of
10It seems to be possible to construct circumstances in
which empty waves do have subtle effects [55,88]. This
discussion is closely related to the “surreal trajectory” de-
bate and will be reviewed in Sec. 4.1.
6information. Whether this radio-wave analogy is
just a metaphor or leads to any deeper insight
remains to be seen. A critical assessment of espe-
cially Bohm’s metaphors can be found in [53].
Another intriguing property of Bohmian-
trajectories gave rise to a specific objection from
Einstein. Since he was one of the famous an-
tagonists of the Copenhagen interpretation it is
interesting to note that he did not endorse the
deBroglie-Bohm theory likewise. In a Festschrift
in honor of Max Born in the year 1953, Einstein
discussed a system for which the deBroglie-Bohm
theory predicts a vanishing velocity. Einstein dis-
cussed a particle in a box as a specific exam-
ple but the same behavior appears in any sys-
tem which is described by a real wavefunction like
e.g. the energy eigenstates of the harmonic oscil-
lator. According to Einstein this vanishing ve-
locity “contradicts the well-founded requirement,
that in case of a macrosystem (i.e. for highly
excited states) the motion should agree approx-
imately with the motion following from classical
mechanics” [73].
However, any measurement on the particle
would need a change in the arrangement (e.g. one
side of the box would have to be removed). The
predicted outcome of any such measurement of
e.g. the particle-momentum would be the same as
in ordinary quantum mechanics. More generally,
the Einstein-objection illustrates, that within the
deBroglie-Bohm theory the representation of any
system is provided by the pair of wavefunction
and position, (ψ,Qi). To focus on properties of
one element only can be misleading11.
3.5. Underdetermination in the deBroglie-
Bohm theory
The deBroglie-Bohm theory reproduces the
statistical predictions of ordinary quantum me-
chanics and underpins them with deterministic
and continuous particle-trajectories. It is tempt-
ing to regard the Bohm-trajectories as the actual
motion of the quantum-objects.
However, Deotto and Ghirardi [30] have shown,
that the deBroglie-Bohm theory is underdeter-
11Einstein’s rejection of the deBroglie-Bohm theory is
clearly not only related to the problem discussed above.
By now famous is his remark in a letter to Born in 1952
about the deBroglie-Bohm theory being “too cheap” [41,
letter from 12.5.1952]. Squires writes in the same context,
that Einstein “was not interested in attempts to ‘cure’ the
theory; rather he wanted to look elsewhere, to start again”
[81]. Squires makes an other insightful remark about the
de Broglie-Bohm theory and Einstein’s probable reason to
reject it: “And it is certainly true that we would not have
discovered statistical mechanics by adding small correc-
tions to thermodynamics, or by adding hidden variables
that were in some way ‘guided’ by the free energy, or some
other thermodynamic quantity” [81].
mined i.e. the quantum mechanical current can
be “gauged” by a divergenceless vector field j′ =
j + a with ∇a = 0. The corresponding guid-
ance condition v′ = j′/|ψ|2 yields the same sta-
tistical predictions, while the individual trajecto-
ries differ from the standard deBroglie-Bohm the-
ory. Hence it is problematic to regard the Bohm-
trajectories derived from Equ. 1 as representing
the “actual motion” of the quantum particles.
In order to sustain the “ontological status” of
the Bohm trajectories one has to formulate ad-
ditional criteria which restrict the possible value
of the vector field a. E.g. Du¨rr et al. [36]
motivate the guidance equation 1 from symme-
try and simplicity constraints. The argument in
[62] is based on the assumption that the corre-
sponding problem for relativistic spin 1
2
parti-
cles has been solved uniquely [61]. Holland and
Philippidis then derive the guidance equation for
the non-relativistic limit and result in a equa-
tion which contains an additional spin-dependent
term. Hence, for spin 0 particles the original form
is recovered.
However, this ambiguity of the deBroglie-
Bohm theory does not undermine its conceptual
value. If the above motivations for the spe-
cific guidance condition ( Equ. 1) are felt un-
convincing, the deBroglie-Bohm theory still pro-
vides a proof of principle that the deterministic
interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible.
Since the measurement of individual trajectories
is beyond the principle reach of experiments one
should not put too much emphasize on their par-
ticular form anyway.
3.6. The status of the quantum equilib-
rium hypothesis
As mentioned in Sec. 2, the deBroglie-Bohm
theory reproduces all predictions of ordinary
quantum theory provided that the initial posi-
tions of particles described by the wavefunction
ψ are |ψ|2 distributed. One may include this as-
sumption in the very definition of the deBroglie-
Bohm theory. Equation 2 ensures that this postu-
late is consistent i.e. any system will stay |ψ|2 dis-
tributed when the quantum equilibrium hypoth-
esis holds initially.
However, introducing the quantum equilibrium
hypothesis as a postulate provokes the objection
that thereby the wavefunction gets two distinct
and logically independent meanings: (i) as the
guiding field and (ii) as a probability distribu-
tion for the particle position. This double role
for the wavefunction looks suspicious and unaes-
thetic. Further more it would remain obscure
how random behavior enters into the determin-
istic deBroglie-Bohm theory. Finally the very
7meaning of such a postulate would be not clear
at all.
It was therefore among the early efforts of
Bohm to clarify the status of the quantum equi-
librium hypothesis and to possibly derive rather
than postulate it. The paper [20] from 1953
was devoted to this question but could derive
the quantum equilibrium hypothesis only for a
limited class of systems [26,90]. This problem
gave rise to the development of a modified ver-
sion of the theory in 1954 including the effect of
a stochastic disturbance [21]. A dynamical ex-
planation of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis
within the original version of the deBroglie-Bohm
theory was also attempted by Valentini [89].
A different approach was developed by Du¨rr
et al. [36]. Their analysis is an elaboration of
work of John Bell and is ultimately rooted in
the approach of Ludwig Boltzmann to statisti-
cal mechanics. The starting point is that regard-
ing the deBroglie-Bohm theory as a fundamen-
tal theory implies that the behavior of subsys-
tems is determined by the “wavefunction of the
universe”, Ψ(q), and the corresponding configura-
tion. One is therefore not free to simply postulate
that subsystems have wavefunctions and are gov-
erned by the deBroglie-Bohm theory. However,
applying the quantum equilibrium hypothesis to
Ψ(q) seems to be physically meaningless since we
do not have a sample of universes. Thus the fol-
lowing two questions need to be addressed: (i)
how to assign a wavefunction to a subsystem and
(ii) what is the meaning of the quantum equilib-
rium hypothesis when applied to Ψ(q). Finally
one can ask how to relate these points i.e. how
to justify the quantum equilibrium hypothesis for
empirical distributions12.
Question (i) leads Du¨rr et al. to the introduc-
tion of the effective wavefunction. Let q = (x, y)
be a decomposition of the configuration of the
universe into the variable x of a subsystem and
y for the rest. Du¨rr et al. define the effective
wavefunction, ψ, of the subsystem as part of the
following decomposition:
Ψ(x, y) = ψ(x)Φ(y) + Ψ⊥(x, y) (4)
The wavefunction ψ(x) represents the subsystem
provided that the y-support of Φ(y) and Ψ⊥(x, y)
is macroscopically distinct and that the actual
value of y lies in the support of Φ(y). A typi-
cal situation of this kind occurs during a mea-
surement on the system described by x with a
measuring device that has, at the end of the mea-
surement, a definite value in the support of Φ(y).
12By them we mean relative frequencies obtained from
repeated experiments on subsystems.
Regarding (ii) Du¨rr et al. argue, that the
meaning of the quantum equilibrium distribution
|Ψ(q)|2 on the universal level is not probabilis-
tic since we do not have a sample of universes.
Instead, it provides a so-called measure of typi-
cality. The notion of typicality (though not the
word) was introduced by Boltzmann in justifying
the second law of thermodynamics. This state-
ment holds because an “overwhelming majority”
of initial conditions leads to a behavior in accor-
dance with the second law [68]. However, the
meaning of “overwhelming majority” i.e. a mea-
sure on the corresponding set, needs to be speci-
fied. One important requirement for this measure
is that it should be “equivariant” i.e. the notion
of typicality should be independent of time. And
in fact, the continuity equation 2 ensures that the
measure |Ψ(q)|2 is equivariant.
Finally, and that is the central result of [36],
Du¨rr et al. can prove that within a “typical” uni-
verse the quantum equilibrium hypothesis holds
for all subsystems. Hence the typical Bohmian
universe – although deterministic – gives the ap-
pearance of randomness in agreement with quan-
tum mechanics.
This justification of the quantum equilibrium
hypothesis has been questioned e.g. by Dickson
[33]. He notes that Du¨rr at al. have not shown
that |Ψ(q)|2 provides the only equivariant mea-
sure. Further more Dickson questions that equiv-
ariance is a preferred property of measures over
the initial distributions at all. He states [33][p.
123]:
Equivariance is a dynamical property
of a measure, whereas the question
‘Which initial distribution is the cor-
rect one?’ involves no dynamics, nor
it is clear why dynamical properties of
a measure are relevant.
This objection challenges the claim that the quan-
tum equilibrium hypothesis can be derived rather
than postulated. However, it should be noted
that for the justification of classical thermody-
namic the question of how to derive apparent ran-
domness from deterministic laws is just as contro-
versial.
4. The theory immanent debate
Until now we were mainly concerned with
meta-theoretical objections which might be
viewed as partially subjective. Consequently,
some of the above mentioned feature of the
deBroglie-Bohm theory have been either used to
reject this theory or to praise its radical novelty.
An other strategy to disclaim the deBroglie-
8Bohm theory has been to seek for a more textual
debate, e.g. challenging its consistency or its abil-
ity to be generalized. One might say that these
arguments try to refute the deBroglie-Bohm the-
ory from “inside”, hence we have classified them
as “theory-immanent”. Most important is the
question whether a trajectory-interpretation is
sustainable in the relativistic domain.
A clear-cut disproof of the deBroglie-Bohm
theory would be an experiment in which the pre-
dictions of the deBroglie-Bohm theory and or-
dinary quantum mechanics differ while the lat-
ter is confirmed. In fact every now and then
such an experiment is proposed. The attempts
to construct circumstances in which the predic-
tions of the deBroglie-Bohm theory and quantum
mechanics disagree are actually pointless since
the deBroglie-Bohm theory reproduces all pre-
dictions of ordinary quantum mechanics by def-
inition. Above all, the Schro¨dinger-equation is
part of the deBroglie-Bohm theory and the indi-
vidual trajectories can not be controlled beyond
the quantum equilibrium. This attempts will not
be considered further and the interested reader
may consult [49,51,84].
4.1. The “surreal trajectory” objection
In 1992 Englert, Scully, Su¨ssmann and Walther
(ESSW) challenged the deBroglie-Bohm theory.
They claimed that Bohm trajectories are not re-
alistic, but “surrealistic”.
The corresponding authors analyze the famous
delayed-choice double-slit experiment invented by
Wheeler [92] and discussed in the context of the
deBroglie-Bohm theory by Bell [11]. Before we
turn to the actual ESSW argument we will first
discuss the original set-up.
The delayed-choice double-slit experiment (see
Fig. 1) consists of a double slit arrangement in
which one can freely choose to detect either inter-
ference patterns in the region I or particles in the
detectors C1 or C2
13. The whole arrangement is
set up in such a way that by symmetry arguments
the trajectories of the deBroglie-Bohm theory are
not allowed to cross the midplane behind the two-
slit screen. They show the “unclassical” behavior,
that the Bohm-trajectories of the particles hitting
the upper part behind the screen have traversed
the upper slit and vice versa.
One may modify the arrangement by supply-
ing it with additional detectors directly behind
the two-slit screen in order to investigate which
slit has been traversed. In such a modified version
13i.e. one can insert a screen in region I in order to detect
the interference pattern. This choice can be made after the
“particles” have passed the slits already, hence the name
delayed-choice.
S1
S2
I
C1
C2
symmetry plane
Figure 1. Delayed-choice double slit experiment.
One may either detect particles in the detectors Ci
or observe interference in region I by insertion of
a screen.
the interference pattern would not occur. Addi-
tionally the deBroglie-Bohm trajectories would
be allowed to cross the midplane since, given the
degrees of freedom related to the detector, it is no
symmetry plane anymore (see [11][p.111] for the
details of this argument.).
The above mentioned extra-detectors directly
behind the screen were assumed to be “ordinary
detectors”, i.e. devices which show a macroscopic
change of state (e.g. pointer positions). We now
turn to the actual ESSW argument. According to
these authors a problem for the deBroglie-Bohm
theory emerges when these extra detectors are
chosen to be advanced quantum optical devices,
so-called “which-way detectors”. These respond
on the transition of single particles without affect-
ing the translational part of the wavefunction14.
Again, in the presence of these devices, we expect
the interference pattern to be destroyed. The spe-
cial feature of these “one-bit detectors” is that
even their excitation does not alter the symme-
try (i.e. ψ1(x, y, z) = ψ2(x, y,−z), with z = 0
being the midplane). Hence the deBroglie-Bohm
trajectories are still forced to “bounce off” the
midplane. However, the probabilities |ψ1|
2 or
|ψ2|
2 are in general not confined to one half of
the screen. According to ESSW one arrives at
the paradoxical situation that the upper which-
way detector fires while the screen is hit below
the midplane. ESSW conclude:
The Bohm trajectory is here macro-
scopically at variance with the ac-
tual, that is: observed track. Tersely:
14E.g. within a micromaser excited Rydberg atoms can
radiate off one photon without any other significant change
of state.
9Bohm trajectories are not realistic,
they are surrealistic.
This paper has created a lively debate on the
“surreal trajectory problem” [7,31,37,58,85,82]
and we do not aim at a complete review. One ob-
jection against the conclusion of ESSW has been
their use of the term “actual track” in connection
with quantum mechanics. ESSW try to defend
the orthodox interpretation – but the notion of a
“particle path” is denied within this interpreta-
tion. What is meant by “actual track” is not ob-
vious here. However, ESSW claim that even the
observed tracks in a bubble-chamber are at vari-
ance with the Bohm-trajectories. This would be
a serious objection against the deBroglie-Bohm
theory indeed.
The essential flaw in the reasoning of ESSW is
that they consider devices which are not linked
to any macroscopic change of state. This fea-
ture is crucial because it ensures that their sym-
metry argument applies. But given that within
the deBroglie-Bohm theory only a change in po-
sition (or of the wavefunction) constitutes a phys-
ical fact, such a which-way detector is not re-
garded as a reliable detector for the actual po-
sition of the particle on its Bohmian path. The
additional claim of ESSW, that even the tracks
in a bubble-chamber differ from the predicted
Bohm-trajectories, is therefore unfounded, since a
bubble-chamber does convert the excitation into
a macroscopic displacement.
But the situation which has been considered by
ESSW is a bit more subtle: The authors assume
that a macroscopic read-out could be connected
after the particle has been finally detected. How-
ever, it remains true that within the deBroglie-
Bohm theory the which-way device is not re-
garded as a detector. A delayed read-out can
not turn it into a more trustworthy device. The
arrangement which has been considered by En-
glert et al. can be viewed as a special case in
which “empty waves” [55] show an effect if they
are still coherent. In fact, the non-locality of
the deBroglie-Bohm theory makes it possible to
explain how the which-way detector can be ex-
cited even without any trajectory passing through
it [31,58]. A detailed discussion of how to re-
solve the “surreal trajectory problem” within the
deBroglie-Bohm theory can also be found in [7].
Along similar lines also other arguments have
been advanced in order to show that “the
Bohmian position does not help to understand
the result of a measurement” [2]. Especially
Aharonov et al. [2–4] have explored Bohm tra-
jectories in the case of “weak” and “protective”
measurements15 in order to challenge any “realis-
tic interpretations of Bohm trajectories” [3]. Sim-
ilar to the original ESSW argument these authors
construct circumstances in which non-local effects
are exerted i.e. alleged measuring devices are trig-
gered while the Bohm trajectories do not pass
through them. They conclude that their analysis
(...) implies that the Bohm trajecto-
ries are forever hidden. If you cannot
rely on local interactions to determine
the ‘actual position’ of the particle,
then you cannot determine it at all.
The concept of position itself becomes
shaky. [3]
However, Aharonov et al. do not claim the incon-
sistency of the deBroglie-Bohm theory:
The examples considered in this work
do not show that the Bohm’s causal
interpretation is inconsistent. It
shows that Bohmian trajectories be-
have not as we would expect from a
classical type model. [2]
Furthermore Aharonov and Vaidman admit, that
“these difficulties follow from our particular ap-
proach to the Bohm theory in which the wave is
not considered to be a ‘reality’.”
Recapitulating, we note that these investiga-
tions have given fascinating insight into detailed
aspects of quantum mechanics in general and
the deBroglie-Bohm theory in particular. They
clearly demonstrate that (especially given the ex-
otic measuring devices considered above) the tra-
jectories behave completely unclassical and that
the deBroglie-Bohm theory is as unintuitive as
the usual quantum theory. However, most adher-
ents of the deBroglie-Bohm theory never argued
that point.
4.2. Fractal wavefunctions
A recent argument against trajectory-based in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics in general
and the deBroglie-Bohm theory in particular was
advanced by Hall [54]. He considers so-called frac-
tal wavefunctions for which the expression Hψ is
divergent16 while the equation [H− ih¯∂t]ψ = 0 is
satisfied still17. Given that the usual Schro¨dinger
equation does not hold for these states, Hall ar-
gues that the modified Hamilton-Jacobi equation
15A “weak measurement” [1] is designed to change the
corresponding system only minimally. A “protective mea-
surement” is both, weak and adiabatic [3].
16There are examples for which the expectation value 〈H〉
is finite nevertheless [54].
17The corresponding states are said to be solutions of the
Schro¨dinger equation in the “weak” sense [94].
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can not be derived. Further more, ∇ψ is not de-
fined and the guidance equation of the deBroglie-
Bohm theory fails to provide trajectories for these
states.
Given that the corresponding states and their
unitary evolution are well defined Hall claims
that trajectory-based interpretations are at least
formally incomplete. Provided that these states
could be actually prepared they may even demon-
strate the physical incompleteness.
In reply to this criticism one may note that the
wavefunctions considered by Hall are unphysical.
More relevant in this context is the question of
global existence of Bohmian trajectories. This is-
sue was settled in [13]. Only recently Tumulka
and Teufel [86] have simplified and extended this
proof to the Bohm-Dirac theory. If a wavefunc-
tion satisfies the conditions for global existence
and uniqueness, then it is ensured that it can not
evolve into e.g. a fractal state [48]. Hence, Hall’s
claim about a possible “physical incompleteness”
seems to be unfounded and his claim of “formal
incompleteness” amount to no more than a spe-
cific definition of “formal”.
4.3. Non-locality and relativistic general-
ization
The by far most common objection against
the deBroglie-Bohm theory is based on its non-
locality and its apparent conflict with relativity.
We will try to disentangle these questions in turn.
The deBroglie-Bohm theory is explicitly non-
local, i.e. the motion of each particle is in general
a function of the coordinates of the whole system,
no matter whether they are space-like separated.
This non-locality vanishes only if the wavefunc-
tion factorizes in the contributions of the differ-
ent quantum objects. Whether this is viewed as
an unacceptable feature depends on the attitude
towards the problem of non-locality in quantum
mechanics in general. In ordinary quantum me-
chanics the problem of non-locality appears in at
least two places: (i) violation of Bell-inequalities
and (ii) reduction of the wavefunction.
Following the work of Bell [9] and the exper-
imental confirmation of quantum mechanics in
EPR-Bell experiments [5] it became widely (but
not universally [70,72]) accepted that quantum
mechanics itself is “non-local”. Following this
opinion the non-locality allegation against the
deBroglie-Bohm theory seems to be even com-
pletely groundless. However, the precise meaning
of the term “non-local” is far from being unique
and their exists a vast literature on that topic
(see e.g. [25]). A thorough discussion of that
issue is far beyond the scope of the present pa-
per. However, one can reasonably state, that the
“non-locality” of the deBroglie-Bohm theory is
more explicit (i.e. dynamical) than the “non-
separability” of ordinary quantum mechanics18.
Anyhow, for both, ordinary quantum mechan-
ics and the deBroglie-Bohm theory, it is ensured
that the “non-locality” or “non-separability” can
not be used for superluminal signalling. But
whether this is enough for full compatibility be-
tween quantum mechanics and special relativity
has been challenged e.g. by Ballentine [6]:
However it is not clear that the re-
quirements of special relativity are
exhausted by excluding superluminal
signals. Nor is it clear how one can
have superluminal influences (so as
to violate Bell’s inequality and sat-
isfy quantum mechanics) that in prin-
ciple can not be used as signals. (· · · )
Whether or not there is a deeper in-
compatibility between quantum me-
chanics and relativity is not certain.
Another indication for “non-locality” in quan-
tum mechanics is given if one adopts the col-
lapse of the wavefunction to be a real physi-
cal process19. After all the collapse is supposed
to reduce the wavefunction instantaneously and
requires thereby a preferred frame-of-reference20
[26,69]. Maudlin argues that the collapse postu-
late in combination with entangled states leads
necessarily to a preferred foliation of space-time
[69, p.297]. While the Dirac equation pro-
vides a Lorentz covariant generalization of the
Schro¨dinger equation the satisfactory generaliza-
tion of the measurement theory into the rela-
tivistic domain is still wanting. Ironically this
specific source of non-locality does not arise in
the deBroglie-Bohm theory since here the col-
lapse of the wavefunction becomes dispensable.
However, as mentioned above, non-locality figures
prominently in the deBroglie-Bohm theory which
makes the reconciliation with relativity challeng-
ing as well.
4.3.1. The Bohm-Dirac theory
Non-locality clearly provides a challenge for a
satisfactory relativistic generalization of quantum
18According to fairly common usage, ”separability” means
that the state of an extended system can be written as a
product of local states while “locality” expresses that no
interaction propagates faster than light.
19In fact, in the context of the “measurement problem”
the collapse of the wavefunction gives rise to other prob-
lems as well.
20An obvious solution to this problem is to suppose that
the collapse occurs only along the backward light cone of
the measurement interaction [17,56]. See e.g. [8] for a
discussion of the problems one faces in this approach.
11
mechanics or the deBroglie-Bohm theory. How-
ever, relativistic generalizations of the deBroglie-
Bohm theory do exist. E.g. for a Dirac parti-
cles Bohm [23] has proposed the following guid-
ing equation (the corresponding framework may
be called “Bohm-Dirac theory”):
v =
ψ†αψ
|ψ|2
(5)
Here ψ is a solution of the Dirac equation, ψ† its
conjugate and α a 3-vector with components that
are build from the Pauli matrices:
αi =
(
0 σi
σi 0
)
(6)
The generalization to the many-particle case is
straightforward [23][p.274]. Thus, the generaliza-
tion itself is not problematic. But it is an essential
property of the many-particle generalization that
it requires a preferred reference-frame i.e. the
many-particle analogue of Equ. 5 considers all
particles at the same time. The predictions do
nonetheless agree with the standard theory and
most important the preferred reference-frame can
be made unobservable.
In fact, as shown in [39], it is even possi-
ble to restore Lorentz invariance for the Bohm-
Dirac theory by introducing additional structure.
Du¨rr et al. introduce an arbitrary space-like
preferred slicing of space-time, determined by a
Lorentz invariant law. An other strategy is pur-
sued by Berndl et al. [16] who suggest a pre-
ferred joint parameterization (i.e. synchroniza-
tion). This works provide an important step to-
wards a Lorentz invariant deBroglie-Bohm theory
and a counter example to the common claim that
non-locality and Lorentz invariance are in strict
opposition. However, these authors admit that
they have not reached yet what Bell called “seri-
ous Lorentz invariance” [11][p.179f]. Furthermore
the corresponding models consider only entangled
but noninteracting Dirac particles. The relativis-
tic generalization of the deBroglie-Bohm theory
is also addressed in [32,46,80]. A thorough dis-
cussion of the relation between non-locality and
relativity can be found in [33].
Summing up, we have seen that non-locality
and the relativistic generalization provide a chal-
lenge not only for the deBroglie-Bohm theory but
also for ordinary quantum mechanics21. The vio-
lation of the Bell-inequality implies that the rela-
tion between quantum mechanics and special rel-
ativity is more subtle than customarily assumed.
21Since the ultimate cause for non-locality is that the
wavefunction of a N-particle system is defined on the con-
figuration space, IR3N , it is not surprising that this “non-
locality” is not a particular problem of the de Broglie-
Bohm theory but for quantum mechanics in general.
The concept of wavefunction collapse points at
similar problems. However, the deBroglie-Bohm
theory does allow for a relativistic generalization
when either the requirement of Lorentz invariance
is relaxed to apply only to the observations or by
introducing additional structure into the theory.
4.4. The deBroglie-Bohm theory and
quantum field theory
Finally (and related to the last paragraph)
there is the widespread suspicion that the con-
cepts of the deBroglie-Bohm theory can not be
sustained in the realm of quantum field theories
(see e.g. the letter to the editor in [52][p. 1227]
together with the reply). However, several works
on that issue have shown that there seems to be
no principle problem to incorporate the concepts
and reproduce the predictions of quantum field
theories. In what follows we only sketch some of
the corresponding results.
Similar to the situation of relativistic general-
izations there are several different approaches to
this question. The work on that issue can roughly
be divided into two camps. The first (e.g. Bohm,
Hiley and Holland [23,60]) introduces the notion
of (bosonic-)field variables as being fundamental
together with the particle position for fermions.
These models provide laws for the evolution of
these fields. However, boson like e.g. the photon
do not possess a trajectory.
The other camp (e.g. Bell [11][p.173] and Du¨rr
et al. [34,35]) sustains the particle-ontology also
within quantum field theoretical extensions of the
deBroglie-Bohm theory. To this end Du¨rr et al.
associate the interaction part of the Hamiltonian
with jump-processes like the creation of particle-
antiparticle pairs.
While important questions remain open (see for
example the discussion at the end of [34]) it seems
premature to reject the deBroglie-Bohm theory
on this basis.
5. Summary
We have collected common criticism against
the deBroglie-Bohm theory. Most of them have
the merit to illustrate the peculiar features of this
theory but they do not provide a rigorous dis-
proof.
One strategy has been to formulate addi-
tional requirements22 which are not met by the
deBroglie-Bohm theory. It remains subjective
whether this is viewed as a profound shortcom-
ing or the radical novelty of this theory. After all,
22The requirements are “additional” to the basic demand
that the theory is in accordance with the experimental
results.
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quantum mechanics has likewise introduced many
bizarre notions into physics. However, while it is
subjective how desirable these additional require-
ments are, they are clearly not irrational.
A different strategy is to address the consis-
tency of the deBroglie-Bohm theory and its abil-
ity to be generalized. The most substantial con-
cern is the question of its relativistic and quantum
field theoretical generalization. However, several
models for such generalizations do exist in which
either the preferred foliation of space-time is un-
observable or even Lorentz-invariance can be (at
least formally) sustained. Although important
questions remain open it seems premature to re-
ject the deBroglie-Bohm theory on this account.
Above all, these objections should be compared
to those which have been advanced against other
interpretations of quantum mechanics, in partic-
ular against the orthodox view.
The merit of this discussion is to reveal that
even in science a theory can not only be judged
by its empirical confirmation23. In the absence
of any experimental test that can distinguish
between standard quantum mechanics and the
deBroglie-Bohm theory one may either leave this
question undecidable or has to invoke e.g. “meta-
theoretical” criteria like the one presented in
Sec. 3. This is completely sound but should be
stated explicitly. We fully agree with Hiley who
states:
Unfortunately there is a great deal of
unnecessary emotion generated when
“alternative interpretations” to quan-
tum mechanics are discussed. By now
we have so many interpretations, that
it must be clear to all that there is
some basic ambiguity as to what the
formalism is telling us about the na-
ture of quantum processes and their
detailed relation to those occurring in
the classical domain. [57]
This “unnecessary emotions” (in part on both
sides) complicate a sober discussion.
It would be highly desirable to have an open
minded discussion in the spirit of appreciation for
the different interpretations. Examples for this
can be found e.g. in the camp of the deBroglie-
Bohm theory, like Goldstein’s work about deco-
herent histories [44] or Tumulka’s contribution
to the GRW program [87]. Similar the “many-
worlder” Vaidman has made illuminative contri-
butions to implications of the deBroglie-Bohm
theory in [88], to pick just a few examples. How-
23This controversy serves as a prime example for Quine’s
thesis of underdetermination of theory by data [79].
ever, also the “orthodox” view deserves a fair dis-
cussion as expressed by Bell in the following less
known quote:
I am not like many people I meet
at conferences on the foundation of
quantum mechanics (. . . ) who have
not really studied the orthodox the-
ory [and] devote their lives criticizing
it (. . . ) I think that means they have
not really appreciated the strength of
the ordinary theory. I have a very
healthy respect for it. (quoted from
[50])
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